This paper presents a general model that covers signaling with and without conflicts of interest between signalers and receivers. Krebs and Dawkins (1984) argued that a conflict of interests will lead to an evolutionary arms race between manipulative signalers and sceptical receivers, resulting in ever more costly signals; whereas common interests will lead to cheap signals or "conspiratorial whispers." Previous simulation models of the evolution of communication 
. Vervets call when they detect one of three (or sometimes four) distinct categories of predator, and the response of the monkeys who hear the call is appropriate: the leopard alarm, for instance, sends hearers scrambling into the relative safety of nearby trees. Surely the adaptive function of this communication system is to help the monkeys avoid predation?
At one time, when group selection as a force in evolution was held in higher regard than it is today, this explanation might have been uncritically accepted. However, the orthodox position in evolutionary biology (Williams, 1966; Dawkins, 1976 ; Maynard Smith, 1993) Reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971) , an arrangement in which one animal bears a cost in order that another may gain a (greater) benefit and later has the favor returned, provides a possible answer. Simulation work such as Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) and Axelrod (1984) Kin selection (Hamilton, 1964) (Zahavi, 1975 (Zahavi, , 1987 . This is the idea that honesty can be maintained if the signals are costly in a particular way. However, the handicap principle has recently received overwhelming theoretical attention (see for example Grafen, 1990; Iwasa, Pomiankowski, & Nee, 1991; Hurd, 1995;  Bullock, 1997) and will only be treated tangentially here.
1.1 Manipulative and cooperative signaling Krebs and Dawkins (1984) Oliphant, 1996) Grafen, 1990 for each participant (Trivers, 1974) , or in which participants place the possible outcomes in a different rank order (Maynard Smith & Harper, 1995 (Hinde, 1981) . Recent models (Grafen, 1990;  Bullock, 1997) Figure 3 shows the average values of the communication index for honest initial conditions. Seeding the population with honesty tests the stability of honest Figure 8 . Figure 9 shows the Figure 11 shows the cross-sectional results for Ps = 5. The use of continuous values for the cost of signals and for the response threshold suggests the possibility of random noise in the signaling channel. In the real world signals will not always be accurately perceived, and Johnstone (1994) (Guilford & Dawkins, 1991; Ryan & Rand, 1993) Figure 15 (using Figure 6 as Krebs and Dawkins (1984) Hurd (1995) , Oliphant (1996) , and Bullock (1997 
